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and many other cases. Whyis a person
enjoined from writing a work for some
rival publisher, contrary to his contract
with the plaintiff not to do so, even
though the second be no infringement
of the copyright of the first book, as held
in Barfidd v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. and Stu.
1 ; Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437?
Why is a party enjoined from practising
this trade or calling, when he has made a
valid contract with the plaintiff not to do
so: Ropes v. Upton, 125 Mass: 258 ;
Btaler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176; Giles
v. Hart, 22 Law Rep. 693 ; Duignan v.
Walker, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 976; .Rolfe v.
Rolfe, 15 Sire. 88.

In these and many other like cases
the plaintiff has a plain remedy at law;
and if the party is pecuniarily responsible, the damages for the violation of the
covenant may be surely recovered ; but
nevertheless the equity jurisdiction is
firmly established in them all, and although the covenant be personal in its
nature, equity finds no difficulty in prohibiting the breach of even such contracts. Should it notbe so in covenants
for one's exclusive labor and services,
and whether the relation of master
and servant, strictly speaking, does or
does not exist ?

RECENT.AMERICAN

EDmuND H. BENNETT.

DECISIONS.

United State8 arcuit Court, Middle Districtof Tennessee.
THE SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO. v. THE NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO.
The transportation of goods and money by express companies having become au
established and important business of great convenience to the general public, it is
the duty of all railroad companies, in the exercise of the trusts confided to them
for the public good, to make proper provision for every express carrier desiring to
carry express matter over their respective roads.
As railroad companies have not the legal capacity to engage in the express business, and are not bound to furnish to the public express facilities, they ought not to
be allowed to exclude from the use of their roads, express companies who can provide such facilities.
Where an express company hag been allowed by a railroad company to transact
which a
business over its road for more than twenty years, and to build up a trade in
large capital is invested, and valuable equipments employed, the railroad company,
from
even if it had authority to exclude the express company, would be estopped
asserting such authority.
It mAkes no difference in such case, that the express company has used the railroad under special contracts, which reserved to the railroad company the right of
terminating them upon notice. Such contracts were in affirmance of the pre-existits capiing legal rights of the express company, in reliance upon which, it invested
tal and built up its business.
railIn enforcing the right of express companies to transact their business upon
more
or
one
of
favor
in
discriminate
can
roads, neither the courts nor the railroads
parties as against others. All are entitled to the same measure of accommodation, who may offer to do the like business.
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MOTION for preliminary injunction.

This was a suit in equity, to restrain the defendant from interfering with or disturbing the business of, the express company;
the
and for a decree to compel the railroad company to furnish
busicompany's
express
the
of
conduct
customary facilities for the
ness. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Stanley Matthews, Clarence A. Seward and F. -E. W-hiteld,
for complainants.
Messrs. Dodd, Bruce, Barnett, East and Houston, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
and in
BAXTER, Cire. J.-We have not time to state fully
in
enter
to
bound
feel
we
detail, all the reasons for the decree
to
well
as
interesting
and
this case. The question is both novel
stated:
thus
the public as to the parties, and may be
The express business, as it is understood and carried on in the
one Alvin
United States, was initiated in 1839. About that time,
Adams began the carriage of small packages of value between the
and
cities of Boston and New York, over the line of the Boston
Worcester Railroad, and the line of steamers connecting therewith,
and plying between New York and Norwich. His enterprise
and
proved remunerative. His success induced others to establish
Philadelphia,
and
York
New
maintain similar express lines between
and Philadelphia and Baltimore, and other important commercial
and
points. These all succeeded well, grew into general favor,
by
time,
this
At
1854.
continued in active operation until July
express
several
these
the mutual consent of the parties interested,
companies were consolidated and merged into the Adams Express
formed
Company, a voluntary association or partnership, which was
This
and organized under authority of the laws of New York.
company, upon its organization, entered actively upon business,
It
and prosecuted the same with unusual energy and success.
railroads
prominent
most
the
of
many
extended its operations over
of
and water lines, and earned, as it justly merited, the confidence
the
of
commencement
its patrons and the general public. At the
in the
rebellion it was doing an extensive and profitable business
suspension
a
Southern States. But the exigencies of war forced
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of its business within the insurrectionary territory, of which exigency the complainant, the Southern Express Company, was born.
The complainant is a corporation organized under and pursuant to
a charter granted by the state of Georgia, and by purchase succeeded to the property, business and good-will of the Adams
Express Company in the Southern States. But the two companies, notwithstanding their separate existence, sustained close business relations, and agreed to the interchange of freights on terms
beneficial to themselves and their customers. By this friendly
co-operation and judicious interchange of business, they so far preserved their unity, as to secure to their patrons all the conveniences that could have been offered by one company doing the
business within the territory occupied by them both. Among
other business of the Adams Express Company to which complainant succeeded, was the business which the former company was
then doing over the several railroads, so far as they were -then in
existence, which now constitute the property of the Nashville,
Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company, which complainant
has continued from its organization till the present time. But
it did said business under special contracts. These contracts
contained stipulations reserving to the respective parties the
right, upon giving the notice prescribed therein, to terminate the
same.
Recently, many changes in the ownership, and consequently in
the management, of railroads in Kentucky, Tennessee, and contiguous states have taken place, whereby the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company's power has been greatly augmented. The
managers of this company, by leases and otherwise, have acquired
the control, it is said, of about four thousand miles of railroad.
The bill alleges that they have recently organized the Union Express Company to transact the express business over the several
railroad lines controlled by it. And that with the view of supplanting the complainant and substituting the Union Express
Company as express carriers on said roads, they caused notices to
be given complainant terminating the contracts under and in virtue
of which complainant has been carrying over said roads. This
charge, however, is denied. But if such was defendant's purpose,
on being better advised, the programme has been abandoned, and
defendant now concludes that it cannot legally thus discriminate
between express carriers; that if it carries for any, it is legally
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bound to carry for every one offering to do the same sort of business
on the same terms.
But defendant is, it seems, determined to exclude complainant
from the use of its road, and now proposes, as the only alternative
left for the effectuation of its determination, to exclude all express
carriers, and do the express business over its road itself. And
hence the question is squarely presented, can defendant legally
refuse to carry for complainant and extend to its messengers and
agents all the facilities hitherto extended to it, and undertake and
do the express business over its road itself? This is the question
which the ficts present.
In order to a correct solution thereof, let us contemplate briefly
the objects for which railroads were created, and the obligations
and duties imposed on them by law.
Railroads are quasi public institutions; they are authorized to
facilitate, and not to control or force from legitimate and natural
channels or hinder or obstruct, the business of the country. Hence
the companies organized to construct them were invested with the
right of eminent domain-with the authority to condemn private
property necessary to the full enjoyment of their franchises, on
paying just compensation therefor. The authority to do this could
only be conferred upon the theory that the public interests, which
they are supposed to represent, require such seizure and appropriation. Under our government, private property cannot be taken
for any other than public uses; vested rights can be made to yield
only to the public necessities; railroads are held to be such necessities, and it is solely on this ground that their construction has been
encouraged by liberal grants of power, and aided by private and
public contributions.
As quasi public instrumentalities, organized to promote the
public good, they are, unless plainly and constitutionally exempted
from such liability, amenable to such just regulations as the legislative department may choose from time to time to prescribe. All
laws deemed necessary to insure good faith in the exercise of their
franchises, or to enforce an honest, impartial, and efficient discharge of their legal duties and obligations, may be enacted; and,
if the right has not been contracted away, the legislature may
prescribe their schedule of charges, compel every necessary facility
to the public and to individuals, to the extent of their means,
enact police regulations, limit the speed of trains, command the
VOL. XXIX.3-75
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use of signals, and order or inhibit the doing of any and everything expedient to advance the general interest of commerce and
intercommunication, insure safety to travellers, and generally to
subserve the purposes of their creation, restricted only by the
constitutional limitation that vested rights are not impaired without
just compensation. They are as amenable to the unwritten (as it
has been judicially expounded) as to the statute law. The first
and perhaps the most important of these principles, settled by
judicial decisions, is that railroad companies, as common carriers,
are bound to the extent of their corporate means to supply all the
accommodations and facilities demanded by the regular and ordinary business of the country through which. they pass. Railroad
carriage has in a large measure superseded every other means of
inland transportation. Everybody, whether they will or not, is
forced to patronize them. And as they were created to subserve
the public good, and undertook to carry persons and property they
are, if able, bound to supply every facility needed for that purpose.
They must keep pace with improvements in machinery, furnish
easy access to and egress from their trains, stop at convenient
points, for the admission and exit of passengers, make adequate
provision and tender suitable cars to carry on the business offered,
and generally to carry passengers and freight, and from time to
time adapt their rolling-stock and equipment to the varying necessities Df advancing civilization and approved methods of doing
business. And next in importance to this leading idea is the
obligation to do exact and even-handed justice to everybody offering to do business with them. If derelict in the performance of
any one of the obligations imposed by law, they may be quickened
thereto by the mandatory power of the courts, or compelled to
surrender their franchises, which they thus refuse or neglect to
exercise in the spirit of their several charters.
But defendants deny that any one or all of the foregoing familiar
principles reach and control the question in this case. Its position,
as we understand it, is that, notwithstanding it is a quasi public
instrumentality, it is also private property belonging to defendant,
and that it is ready, able, and willing and now offers, to render to
the public every service which the public has a right to demand,
including the carriage of express matter, over its road, and protests that complainant has no legal right to use its road against
its wishes and in the manner claimed, and, by a forced use thereof,
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enter into competition with it in the carriage and delivery of
express freight.
At first blush this position seems to be well taken, but, on further
consideration, is found to be more plausible than substantial. As
a common carrier the defendant is as much bound to carry for
another common carrier as it is to carry for other persons. The
proposition, as it is stated, will not be controverted. Defendant
cannot and does not deny its obligation to carry for the complainant.
Its claim is that it is only bound to carry for the complainant when
complainant, like other forwarders, delivers its freight into its
care and custody, to be handled, transported, and delivered by it
through its own agents and servants; that complainant has no
legal right to demand and enforce the use of defendant's passenger
trains for the purpose of carrying freight in the special keeping
of its own employees, to be by them handled in transitu, and delivered at way stations and other places of consignment, and to
have provided therefor special accommodations, such as have been
heretofore supplied to it under special contract. It is upon this
point the contest is to turn.
The issue is not, therefore, whether the defendant is bound to
carry for the complainant, but can it be compelled to carry in the
manner and with the divided responsibility proposed. Herein lies
the novelty and importance of the question.
No such question could have well arisen a half a century ago,
because the methods of doing business and the facilities then provided for inland transportation were not such as to raise it; but
we have made wonderful progress since that time in physical as
well as mental development, and no instrumentality subject to
man's service has been more potential in bringing about the change
than railroads. They are as potential in peace as in war. We
now have about 90,000 miles of railway in the United States,
which cost more than $3,000,000,000, employing not less than
400,000 persons, and yielding more than $500,000,000 of annual
gross earnings.
Their rapid transit has made luxuries, which, but for the facilities afforded by them, would be unknown in the interior landlocked localities of this great country, possible to the most remote
sections. Tropical fruits, fish from the oceans and lakes, and
oysters from the bays, are now, through the co-operative energies
of the railroads and express carriers, within the reach of almost

596 SOUTHERN EXP. CO. v. NASHVILLE, &c., RAILWAY CO.
every community. These facilities making possible and suggesting
corresponding changes in the methods of business, and gradually,
but certainly, working changes in the habits and tastes of the
masses of our people, have opened up the way for and called
express transportation into use. The duties and office of railroads
and express carriers are widely different and totally distinct. The
former was created to furnish motive power and to receive, carry,
and deliver such freights as are appropriate to such a mode of
transportation. But the legislatures granting railroad charters,
with perhaps few exceptions, never contemplated nor expected
them to carry money, gold or silver bullion, bonds, bank notes,
deeds, and other valuable papers, jewels, and other small articles
of great value, fruits, fresh meats, fish, oysters, or other like commodities liable to rapid decay, or live animals requiring special
care and attention during their transportation; nor are railroad
companies authorized by their charters to receive notes, drafts, or
other choses in action for collection and return of proceeds, nor to
receive and forward freight with the bills and charges of the
forwarder attached to be collected from the assignee on delivery
and returned to the shipper, and in connection with such business
to afford to the public, under a single contract, and on assured
responsibility, safe, reliable, and speedy transportation from and
to all points accessible by the use of two or more railroads; noi
are railroads, under their charters, required to render such services.
Much of the services rendered by express carriers, and appropriate
to their peculiar functions, is not such as is by law imposed on
railroads. If express carriers were ejected from the railroads,
the latter could not be compelled to supply their places, and, consequently, the country would be without such facilities, unless the
railroad companies would exceed their corporate obligations, and
voluntarily undertake to do what they are not legally required to
do, and to do many things which under their charters they have
no right to do. As they are under no legal obligations to render
such accommodations to the public, and could not be compelled
to render them, they could, after ejecting the express carriers,
monopolize the business, dictate oppressive rates, while affording
less safety, celerity, and convenience to customers, as a substitute
for the expeditious, reliable, and necessary services of expressmen.
The country would be dependent upon an illegal assumption of
authority by railroads, an assumption in some respects in contra-
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vention of public policy, because it would enlarge their power and
to
influence for controlling the business of the country, which,
say the least, is already sufficiently formidable.
But it is enough to say that railroads were not created to do an
no legal
express business, are not suited to such service, possess
perand
undertake
to
required
be
capacity to engage in it, cannot
in
engage
to
permitted
be
to
form it, and, I may add, ought not
corporate
their
vires
ultra
these branches of the express business,
render
powers, if they would; and, as they are not legally bound to
excluding
by
they,
express facilities to the country themselves, can
the expressmen, deprive the public altogether of this necessary
facility? Or else extort such concessions as the petty resentment
We
or cupidity of their managers might prompt them to exact?
think not.
On the contrary, if the express business, as we have hereinpublic,
before asserted, has become a convenience to the general
their
through
companies,
railroad
we think it the duty of all
for
them
to
confided
trusts
the
of
managers, and in the exercise
wishing
everybody
for
the public good, to make proper provision
to carry express matter over their respective roads, as, in doing so,
to that
they would be accommodating the public, and fulfilling,
extent, the objects and purposes of their creation.
The express business, which had its inception as herein previon by
ously stated, now extends. all over the states; is carried
of the sevenumerous organizations, which meet the requirements
every railoccupies
and
business;
do
they
ral localities in which
have an
They
purpose.
the
for
road line in the country available
Southern
and
Adams
the
and
invested capital of over $30,000,000,
miles
Express Companies have in daily use and occupation 21,216
over
trips,
daily
911
of railroad; employ 4297 persons; make
annually.
travel
of
64,560 miles, aggregating 19,884,420 miles
railroad
And for the transportation of their freights, they pay the
as
alleged,
companies over $2,000,000 per year. It is further
that
showing the extent and magnitude of the express business,
these companies carried for the government $1,200,000,000 in
1878, and $661,000,000 in 1879, and for private parties, in the
that
last-named year, the enormous sum of $1,050,000,000; and
New
in
disburses,
and
receives
the Adams Express Company alone
connecYork City, 14,000 packages daily, employing therefor, in
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tion with their general business, 918 horses, with the necessary
number of wagons.
From this summary it will be seen, that the express carriage of
the country is only second in importance to railroad transportation;
and that the express business has so interwoven itself into the
present methods, that it cannot be dispensed with, without producing an abrupt and disastrous revulsion in the present mode of
carrying on trade. It has grown into immense proportions, and
has become a necessity that cannot be dispensed with. It has
attained its present enlarged usefulness under the fostering care of
the railroads themselves, including the defendant company. It is
profitable to the railroads, and useful and convenient to the public.
The right of the public to have quick, reliable and safe carriage of
goods, through expressmen, has been recognised for forty years.
This general recognition by the public and by railroad corporations, in connection with its admitted utility, stamps it as a legitimate mode of railroad carriage. If legitimately within the scope
of their charters, it is a legal duty imposed by law upon them.
Endowed with extraordinary privileges, to enable them to fulfil
the purposes of their being, they may be coerced to adapt their
accommodations to the varying wants and necessities of general
trade. They must keep abreast with advancing thought, as well
as with mechanical development. If they are under legal obligation to attach a Westinghouse air-brake or a Miller platform, as
insuring greater safety to employees and passengers, they are likewise bound to adapt their facilities for transportation to the growing demands and conveniences of trade. Such requirements can
work no injustice to them, and is no invasion of their vested rights.
For such improved service, they are entitled to compensation to
the extent of the maximum allowed by their respective charters.
No express carrier can lawfully demand the carriage of his goods,
without paying reasonable rates therefor. The carriage of such
freights is in the strict line of railroad duty; it is a class of business that pays well, and such as the railroads have heretofore
sought after. And if the custody of the freights is retained by the
express carriers, the railroads will not be liable for anything more
than the safe carriage of them. If they provide for the carrying
and safely transport such freight, they will have done their full
duty; and by doing this, the railroads will realize the freight
charges, and the expressmen will be enabled to fulfil their engage-
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ments and continue their business, keep up the continuity of their
connections, and the public will be supplied with an indispensable
ficility; and no injury or injustice will be done to any one, unless
it may be that railroad companies and railroad managers, shall be
deprived thereby of i'ncidental profits and advantages to be obtained
through unauthorized pursuits, and forced from the public, by reason of the monopoly secured through the exclusion of lawful competition. We conclude, therefore, that upon the naked obligation
which the law imposes on railroad companies, and without reference to the consideration to be hereafter adverted to, that the
defendant is bound to render the services demanded by the complainant; and that this court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion,
ought to require defendant to discharge its legal duty in this regard.
The second ground on which we think the relief prayed for may
be granted, is this: Complainant and the Adams Express Companies, have for more tham twenty years done business over the
system of roads now directly and indirectly under the control of
the managers of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company.
By energy, fidelity and the expenditure of a large amount of
money, they have succeeded in building up and establishing a lucrative business over these lines, which constitute important links, securing continuity in their operations. They have trained and reliable
servants, suitable chests, safes, wagons, horses and trucks, for collecting, transferring and delivering their freights. They have
erected permanent offices and warcrooms at various stations, established rapid communications and fixed and published a schedule of
charges; and have a good and profitable, steady and reliable business, and an enviable and widely-advertised reputation: all of
which has been accomplished, and the rights incident thereto
acquired, under the friendly auspices of those who are now seeking
to deprive complainant of the use of defendant's road. If defendant possessed the legal right, which we deny, to refuse the accommodations which it has heretofore extended to the complainant, it
ought not to be permitted to exercise it under the facts of this case.
Defendant's long acquiescence in complainant's right to have transportation of its freight ; the holding itself out for so long a time as
the carrier of express matter; the encouragement it has always
given to this class of business, considered in connection with the
investments made and the rights of the public to such service.
must, in our judgment estop it from exerting its authority to exclude
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complainant, if it had any, at this time. A refusal to carry as
heretofore for the complainant, would inevitably do it great pecuniary injury, dissever its connections, cause it to lose the good-will
of its customers, and depreciate its valuable property and equipments along defendant's road-perhaps one-half. Complainant
ought not to be held to be so dependent on the mercy of its adversaries and interested competitors, seeking to drive it from the field
in order to insure a monopoly to themselves. Defendant responds,
saying, that hitherto complainant has occupied its road under and
in virtue of special contracts; and it contends, that complainant's
enjoyment of the privileges thus granted, confers nothing more
than was accorded by these contracts. The position, in a qualified
sense, is correct, but it is as equally correct that complainant lost
nothing thereby. A farmer or other person wishing to ship one or
more car-loads of stock or grain, or other commodity, may with a
view to convenience, specially contract for a car or cars suitable
for the particular purpose, to be furnished at a specified time and
place, and for such other facilities as he may need, but his doing
so is no surrender of his legal rights existing independently of
contracts or special agreements, to demand of a railroad company
the shipment of all suitable freight tendered for the purpose. The
same principle is applicable here. It was altogether proper that
the complainant and defendant, in view of the magnitude of their
business, should by special contract stipulate for the facilities to be
furnished by the one to the other, and fix the terms and conditions
upon which the business should be done, but no right arising to
the complainant from public considerations, or the charter obligations of the defendant, was thereby waived. These contracts were
in affirmance of the pre-existing legal rights of the complainant,
and an admission by the defendant that the business proposed was
within the scope of its duties and reasonably remunerative. It
was in the reliance upon these rights conferred by law and public
considerations, and thus recognised by defendant, that the complainant made the investments mentioned, and built up and
established its said business, and it would be no less than a fraud
upon it for the defendant to exclude it from all further use of its
road, rob it of its established, extensive and profitable business,
and transfer it to another or appropriate the business to itself. It
will not be permitted to perpetrate such injustice.
But we do not wish to be misunderstood. The fact that the
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eomplainant has pre-occupied the defendant's road confers no priority of right. The defendant, to the extent of its corporate
authority, the Union Express Company, and all other persons or
companies wishing to engage in the carrying of express matter
over defendant's road, can enter upon that business on equal terms
with the complainant. Neither the railroad companies nor the
courts can discriminate in favor of one or more parties as against
others. All are entitled to the same measure of accommodation
who may offer to do the like business, and it is the duty of the
courts to enforce, whenever applied to, this legal rule of impartial
justice. We have no disposition to discourage or hinder any one
from entering into competition with complainant. The more of
them, the better it will be for the railroads, as well as for the public.
The railroads will thereby have more business, and the public will
be better protected against exorbitant prices and the exactions of
aggregated wealth and business combinations. Equal protection
to all will do this. It can, however, never be attained by taking
the fruit of one man's labor and giving it to another. Antagonisms between railroads and the public exist more or less in every
locality, and is too often manifested in the verdicts of jurors, unjust
legislation, and various other ways. This is to be regretted, but
the surest way of counteracting these popular resentments is to
require the railroad companies and their managers to keep within
their legitimate spheres, and compel them, in good faith, to administer the trust confided to them for the public good. This court is
as ready to protect railroad companies in the full enjoyment of
their franchises, and against the injustice mentioned above, as it is
solicitous to compel them to do their full duty to the public.
Judge TREAT, of Missouri, Judge GRESIIAM, of Indiana and
Judge WOOD, of the Fifth Circuit, indicated the bent of their
minds by granting restraining orders similar to the order issued in
this case. I have consulted two of the district judges of this circuit who concurred in the Conclusion herein announced. Justice
HARLAN, as I understand his recent decree, decided the same
question, in the same way, and the associate justice assigned to the
circuit, on being requested a few days since, to sit with me on the
hearing of this motion, said that he had great confidence in the
learning and accurate discrimination of Justice HARLAN, and that
he had no idea that he would, after investigation of the question,
dissent from the decision made by the former. These intimations
VOL. XXIX.-76
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and concurrent views coming from so many and such high sources,
have very materially strengthened the convictions which I have
myself entertained In relation to the questions involved. I shall
follow the ruling of Justice HARLAN, and continue the restraining
order until a final hearing can be had.
The present contest between the railroad companies and the express companies is, in some respects, analogous to,
and in others widely different from the
contest long carried on in England
between the railroad companies and the
individual carriers or forwarders. In
England the railroads, at an early stage
of their existence, added to the business
of transporting goods over their rails
the accessory business of collecting and
delivering goods by horse power at the
residences of the shippers and consignees. In this business they came at
once into competition with individual
carriers for the public, who made use of
the railroad for transportation from station to station, but who performed themselves the accessory service of collecting
and delivering the goods by horse power.
In order to secure a monopoly of this
business, and especially of the transportation of small, light freights, the railroads discriminated against the carriers
They claimed the
in their charges.
right to charge for a "packed parcel,"
made up, by the carrier, of smaller parcels, the same rate as if each smaller
parcel had been separately shipped, and
to charge the carrier for railway service
alone the same rate as they charged individuals for both the railway service
and the accessory service of collection
and delivery. This led to a long litigation resulting in numerous decisions in
favor of the carrier and establishing, 1st,
that for a "packed parcel" the railroad
company could not claim the same rate
as if the smaller parcels had been separately shipped, and 2d, that the company could not by any discrimination
against the carriers in its rates or its
regulations give either to itself or to any

particular carrier a preference or advantage in the accessory business of collection and delivery: See Pictordv. Grand
Junction Railroad Co., 10 M. & W. 399
(1842) ; Parker v. Great Western Railroad Co., 7 M. & G. 252 (1844) ; Edwards v. Great Western Railroad Co.,
11 C. B. 588 (1851) ; Crouch v. London 4- N. Tr Railroad Co., 25 Eng. L.
& Eq. 287 (1854) ; Crouch v. Great
Northern Railroad Co., 9 Exch. 556
ame, 11 Id. 740
(1854); Same v.
(1856); Marriott v. London 6- S. TV.
RailroadCo., 1 C. B. N. S. 498 (1857);
Baxendale v. North Devon Railroad Co.,
3 Id. 324 (1857) ; Piddington v. South
Eastern Railroad Co., 5 Id. 1I1 (1858) ;
Baxendale v. Great lWestern Railroad
Co., Id. 309 (1858) ; Same v. Same,
Id. 336 (1859); Garton v. Bristol 4Exeter Railroad Co., 6 Id 639 (1859),
Afl'd in the House of Lords, 7 Jurist
N. S. 173; &ame v. Sume, 1 B. & S.
112 (1861); Baxendale v. Bristol 4Exeter Railroad Co., 11 C. B. N. S. 787
(1862) ; Baxendale v. London 4- S. W.
Railroad Co., 12 Id. 757 (1862); Boxendale v. Great Western Railroad Co.,
14 Id. 1 (1863), Affirmed 16 Id. 137;
Sutton v. Great W1'estern Railroad Co.,
3 H. & C. 800 (1865), afd in Great
Western Railroad Co., v. Sutton, Law
Rep., 4 H. L. 226 (1869) ; Parkinson
v. Great Western Railroad Co., L. R., 6
C. P. 554 (1871) ; Palmer v. London B.
4- S. Railroad Co., Id. 194 (1871).
These cases were decided upon a construction of the various charters of the
companies and the general Railway Acts,
all of which prescribed equality of rates
and facilities in the dealings of the comThe courts
panies with the public.
seemed to be of opinion that the snme
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tesult would not have been reached
under the common law, BL.%CKDuvR-,
J., in Great Western Railroad Co. v.
Suttonl, supra, saying: "At common
law a person holding himself out as a
common carrier of goods was not under
any obligation to treat all customers
equally. Tile obligation which the common law imposed upon him was to
accept and carry all goods delivered to
him tbr carriage according to his profession (unless he had some reasonable
excut-e for not doing so) on being paid
a reasonable compensation. * * *
The fact that the carrier charged others
less, though it was evidence to show
that the charge was unreasonable, was
no more than evidence tending that way.
There was nothing illthe common law
to hinder a carrier from carrying -or
favored individuals at an unreasonably
low rate or even gratis."
In considering the English cases it
must he borne in mind that there is an
important di.tinction between the business of the individual carriers in that
country and that of tie express companies in the United States. The carriers
simply collect the goods, attend to their
delivery to the railroad company, receive
company at the terminus
them from tile
and deliver them to the consignee. The
railroad company retains the exclusive
possession of the goods while in transportation over its rails, and the exclusive control of such transportation, and
does not grant to the carrier those facilities over and upon its line which are
usually possessed by express companies.
In the United States the fact that the
rsilroads have until recently confined
their business to transportation over
their rails, led to the establishment of
express companies for the safe carriage
and delivery of light and valuable articles of freight (Redfield on Carriers,
Sec. 50). These companies were favored by the railroad companies, who
from -line to time entered into con-
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tracts granting them special privileges
over tile roads, including the use of
special cars, tie carriage of sates, the
occupation of space in baggage cars
on passenger trains, the carriage of
messengers who had direct control over
the express matter and its loading and
unloading, and in general all those
privileges which are known as" express
The business thus stimufacilities."
lated has grown to tle innense proportions referred to ill the opinion in the
principal case.
The first question which arose in regard to the relations between the railroads and the express companies was
whether the railroad could, by contract,
give to one express company exclusive
or preferential privileges, or whether
all express companies desiring to operate over the road were entitled to equal
This question arose in
advantages.
Sanzd1brd v. Catawissa IV. 4- E. Railroad Co., 12 Harris 378 (1855) and
New England l.rprss (o. v. Maine
Cent. Railroad Co., 57 Me. 188 (1869) ;
(s. c. 9 Am. Law Reg. Y. S. 728 with

note by Judge

IIEDFIELD.)

In both

ca-es it was decided that no exclusive or
preferential rights could be contrred.
It is noticeable that in both cases the
court takes the broad view that the
granting of preferential privileges to one
company was illegal under the common
law and that statutes forbidding such
preference were only in affirmance of
that law, LEwis, C. J., in 5andlord v.
Railroad Co., saying: " Wherever a
charter is granted for the purpose of constructing a railroad and the corporation is
clothed with the power to take private
property in order to carry out the object,
it is an inference of law from the extent
of the power conferred and the subjectmatter of the grant that the road is for
the public accommodation. The right to
take tolls is the compensation to be received for the benefits conferred. If
the public are entitled to these advantages it results from the nature of the
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right that the benefits should be extended
to all alike, and that no special privileges should be granted to one man or
set of men and denied to others. The
special stipulations inserted in charters
for the purpose of securing these rights
are placed there in abundance of caution
and affirm nothing more than the common right to equal justice which exists
independent of such provisions ;" and
APPLETON, C. J., in New EnglandExp.
Co. v. Maine Cent. Railroad Co., saying : "The very definition of a common
carrier excludes the idea of the right to
grant monopolies or to give special and
unequal preferences. It implies indifference as to whom they may serve and
an equal readiness to serve all who may
apply and in the order of their application. The defendants derive their chartered rights from the state. They owe
an equal duty to each citizen. They
are allowed to impose a toll, but it is
not to be so imposed as specially to
benefit one and injure another. They
cannot, having the means of transporting all, select from those who may apply
some whom they will, and reject others
whom they can but will not, carry.
They cannot rightfully confer a monopoly upon individuals or corporations.
They may regulate transportation, but
the right to regulate gives no authority
to refuse, without cause, to transport
certain individuals and their baggage
and goods and to grant exclusive privileges of transportation to others. The
state gave them a charter for no such
purpose."
See also to the same effect: McDuffee
v. Portland 4- Rochester Railroad Co.,
52 N. H. 430 (1873); and Texas Express Co. v. Texas - Pacific Railroad
Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 426 (1881).
In 1873 the question discussed in the
principal case was raised in the United
States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Camblos v.
The Philadelphia 4- Reading Railroad
.Co., 9 Phila. 411. The facts of that

case were as follows: The Adams Express Company had been carrying on the
express business over the Philadelphia &
Reading Railroad under a contract terminable by either party upon sixty days'
notice. The railroad company gave the
stipulated notice, and after the expiration thereof undertook to carry on itself
the express business as a branch of its
railway service. It refused to allow
the express company any other thcilities
for the transportation of express freight
than it allowed to individual shippers;
denied to the express company's messengers any special privileges on its
road or in its depots; claimed the right
to charge for a "packed parcel" the
same rate as if each smaller parcel had
been separately shipped, and demanded
from the express company .she same rate
for transportation over its road as it
charged to those for whom it performed
the accessory service of collection and
delivery by horse power. After the sixty
days' notice had expired and the railroad
company had entered upon the transaction of the express business the express company filed a bill against the
railroad company for an injunction to
compel the allowance to complainants of
"express facilities" over respondent's
road, and to restrain respondents from
making overcharges in the transportation of complainant's freight. The
court refused the injunction. McKrA , Cire. J., based his opinion upon
the ground that a mandatory injunction
4hould not be granted except in extreme
cases, and that the questions raised
were not of such urgent significance as
to call for their decision before finJ
hearing.

CADWALA nER, J., however,

delivered an opinion on the merits in
which the circuit justice concurred. This
opinion contains a thorough discussion
of all the questions involved in the case
and a review of the authorities, both
English and American, bearing on the
subject. The conclusions reached, briefly
stated, were 1st. That the railroad com.
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pany had the right to engage in the express business as accessory to its business of carrying by rail ; 2d. That it
was entitled to a monopoly of the transportation of goods over its rails, and
that the claim of the express company to
express facilities over its road, such as
special cars, or exclusive space in baggage cars, or the transportation of
agents with rights superior to those of
an ordinary passenger, could not be
sustained; 3d. That the railroad company could not charge for a "packed
parcel" the same rate as if each smaller
parcel had been separately shipped, nor
could it charge the express company for
the accessory service of collection and
delivery by horse power, but that the
question as to the reasonable amount of
charges to be made to the express company should be first settled by a judgment at law, before the granting of relief by injunction. The bill in this case
was subsequently dismissed upon a demurrer for want of jurisdiction: Dinsmore v. Philadelphia6- Reading Railroad
Co., 2 Weekly Notes of Cases 275.
The same question came before the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1874
in the case of Sargent v. Boston 5
Lowell Railroad Co., 115 Mass. 416.
This was an action against the railroad
company to recover damages for breaking up plaintiff's business as an expressman. Plaintiff had for a long time enjoyed, under a contract with the railroad
company, "express facilities" over its
road. 'Upon the termination of the
contract in December 1865, the railroad
let to other parties the exclusive privilege of conducting the express business,
and on the termination of this lease in
January 1868 took upon itself the management of such business under the
name of the "parcels department."
During all this time and down to the
commencement of the suit in 1871, it
had refused to allow plaintiff " express
facilities." A statute of Massachusetts,
passed in 1867 enacted that every rail
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road should give to all persons '"reasonable and equal terms, facilities and accommodations" for transportation, &c.
The question whether the lease to other
persons of exclusive privileges over the
road was illegal was not distinctly
raised by the pleadings, and the case
was decided upon the single point
whether the railroad compan'1, if it conducted the express business itself, was
obliged at common law or under the
statute to allow to plaintiff also, facilities for carrying on such business. The
decision of the court was in favor of the
railroad company, NVELLS, J., saying:

complaint then
"Tile gravamen of tile
is, not that the defendants have refused
to give him 'equal terms, facilities and
accommodations ' with other persons and
companies, but simply that they have
refused to give him such facilities as lie
requires for his special business as carrier over their roads. His claim mnst
stand upon the right to demand such
facilities independently of any enjoyment of like facilities by others. As an
absolute right this cannot be maintained.
The plaintiff contends that the ' parcel
department,' which the defendants have
established to the exclusion of tie plaintiff and others desiring to make like
arrangements, is in contravention of the
equality required by the statute as much
as if it were conducted in the interest
of a third party. But we think the
statute was intended to apply to the
dealings of the railroad corporation with
the public and not to the mode in which
it should arrange and conduct the different branches of its business as a
carrier. All that the plaintiff can demand is, that in each of those branches
he shall havg equal terms with other
persons and companies.

*

*

*

*

There was no refusal to carry the plaintiff and his freight upon the same terms
and in the same manner as the defendants performed the service for other
persons and companies. It was a refusal only to permit the plaintiff to
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occupy a portion of the space in the
cars and stations in the same manner
and for the same purpose as the defendants themselves used and occupied
them, paying therefor and for the required transportation some special rate
which could not well be adjusted otherwise than by special agreement."
The question whether the carrying on
of the express business by the railroad
company was ultra vires was held immaterial to the issue, and was not decided.
The question decided in these cases
nas again been raised in a number of
suits, of which the principal case is one.
Four railroad companies gave notice to
the Adams and Southern Express companies, operating over their roads, that
the then existing contracts for the transportation of express freight would be terminated at the expiration of the period of
notice stipulated for therein. Before
the expiration of the notice the express
companies filed bills against the respective railroads and obtained the restraining orders mentioned in the principal
case, and subsequently in one of the suits
a preliminary injunction was granted by
Judge HARLAw, also referred to in the
principal case, and the decree for which
will be found reported in full in Dinsmore
v. Louisville N. 4- C. RailroadCo., 3 Fed.
Rep. 593. The original bills upon
which the restraining orders were granted
averred that the railroads had entered
into a contract with the Union Express
Company for the exclusive privilege of
conducting the express business over their
roads, and that the notice given to complainants was for the purpose of carrying
out this contract. Afterwards supplemental bills were filed, averring that
since the granting of the restraining
orders the railroad companies bad abandoned their contract with the Union
Express Company, and had undertaken
the management of the express business
themselves. The motion for a preliminary injunction in the principal case,
raised, therefore the same question that

was at issue in Camblos v. Philadelpda
and Sargent v.
Boston 5- Lomell Railroad Co., supra.
The court arrives at a different conclusion from that reached in those erises.
and its decision has since been approved
and followed in Southern Exp. Co. v.
Louisville 6- Nashville Railroad Co., 4
Fed. Rep. 481. -in the latter case, K:v,
J., says: "The idea cannot now he
entertained that railroads, directly or by
indirection, can trammel or destroy express enterprises by excluding express
companies from their lines or by fettering them with unjust regulations or
unfair discriminations. Nor can a railroad assume to itself the exclusive right
or privilege of carrying on the express
business over its own lines or any portion of them. I do not undertake to

6- Reading RailroadCo.

say that a railroad may not undertake
to act as an expressman, but, if it should
undertake to do so, it must do it as an
expressman and not as a railroad. It
is no part of its duty or privilege as a
railroad. If, then. in the conduct of its
business as expressman, its duties, relations and operations be different and
distinct from those appertaining to it as
a railroad it must treat its express depertinent as though it had a separate
individuality from that ofthe railroad-as
though it were a stranger to the railroad
in so far as relates to its transactions
with other express companies. It must
give to it no opportunities, advantages
or privileges it does not allow to other
express companies carrying on a like
The opinion in this case
business."
contains also an interesting extract from
the testimony of one of the railroad
officials, giving some of the reasons for
the change of policy on the part of the
railroads, with regard to express companies.
The issue thus raised by the conflict
of authorities is one of great interest and
is by no means easy of solution. The
argument on the part of the railroads is,
in brief, that the right to perform the
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accessory service of collection and delivery of freight by horse power has
been long exercised in England by the
railroads and is in that country and on
the Continent a recognised branch of
railway service; that the railroads in
this country could not lose this right by
mere non user; that so long as they
serve the general public impartially they
have by their charters the exclu-ive right
to the control and management of
freight while in transportation over their
rails, and that so long as tiler grant to
the express companies the same rights
as they grant to the individual shipper,
they cannot, without a violation of their
franchises be compelled to allow the
agents of such companies the right to
enter their cars and depots and take
charge of and control the freight while
in transmission; that the privileges
heretofore enjoyed by the express companics arose from special contracts and
can have no legal existence after such
contracts have been determined. Tile
argument on the part of the express
companies is that the growth of the cx-

press business has been largely due to
its encouragement by the railroads, and
their refusal to collect or deliver goods
except at their stations ; that they have
suffered the business to reach such proportions that it cannot now be carried
on without the allowance of "express
facilities'' over their roads; that they
have no authority to carry on an express
business themselves, or if they have
authority such business is accessory to
and not part of their ordinary business
as carriers by rail, and that for a railroad to carry on the express business
itself and deny to the express companies
''express flicilities " is to so nmaage its
road as to give to itself a preftrencc or
advantage in the conduct of an accessory
business, a preference which, by a long
train of decisions in England, has been
held illegal.
Owing to the magnitude of the interests involved the contest may be Icg
contimed, and it is not improhable that
it may give rise to future federal and
state legislation.
Fn.LxK P. PaIcHUARD.

Supreme Court of the United States.
ROBERT MITCHELL v. A. M. OVERMAN, ADM. oF STUTZMAN.
Where delay in entering a judgment arises from the act of the court, on account
of its convenience, or the press of business, or the difficulty of the question involved,
or any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties but within the control
of the court, the judgment may be entered retrospectively as of a time when it should
or might have been entered.
It is the duty of a court to enter its judgment nunc pro tunc when justice to the
parties can only be done in that way.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.
In July 1866, Stutzman commenced an action against Robert
Mitchell and others, in the District Court for the county of Webster,
a court of general jurisdiction, in the state of Iowa. Two of the
defendants, although duly served with process, failed to appear,
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and against them, a decree pro confesso was entered by the state
court, at its October Term 1868. As to all the other parties, the
plaintiff and the defendants being present in person, or by counsel,
the cause (as stated in the record) "was submitted upon the pleadings and proofs on file; and, after argument of counsel, the cause
was then finally submitted, and taken under advisement by the
court, the decree herein to be rendered as of the term of said trial
and submission." Thereafter, at the October Term 1870, Mitchell
"asked leave to amend his answer, which was granted, at the May
Term 1871, upon terms." Subsequently, at the October Term
1872. that "amendment was stricken from the files for non-compliance with such terms;" and, thereupon, the court, at the last
named term, to wit, on November 10th 1872, rendered a decree in
favor of Stutzman against Mitchell for the sum of $3396.58, with
interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from
October 16th 1868, and for the costs. It was further ordered that
the decree be "entered now [then], as of the 16th day of October
1868, the last day of the October Term of this court 1868, and
shall take effect as of that date."
While the case was held under advisement, to wit, in November
1869, Stutzman, the sole plaintiff, died intestate. No suggestion,
or notice of his death, was ever made of record, nor was the suit
revived in the name of his personal representative, to whom, under
the laws of Iowa, the right of action survived. Indeed, administration upon his estate was not had until November 26th 1872.
At the time the decree was rendered, neither Mitchell nor his
attorney had any knowledge of Stutzman's death, but that fact was
known to Stutzman's attorney of record, who drafted and procured
the entry of the decree. it was, however, found by the court
below, to which the cause was submitted upon a written stipulation,
waiving a jury, that there was no fraud in obtaining the decree.
Upon the decree of the state court, Overman, administrator of
Stutzman, on the 15th September 1873, commenced an action
against Mitchell in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Ohio. The defence was placed upon the
ground that Stutzman was dead when, on the 10th of November
1872, the decree in the state court was, in fact, entered; and, for
that reason, the decree, it was claimed, was absolutely void. The
defence was held insufficient and judgment was rendered against
Mitchell for the full amount of the Iowa decree. It was assigned
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for error that the facts found do not authorize the judgment in the
Circuit Court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-The common law was in force, in Iowa, during
the whole period from the commencement to the conclusion of the
suit in the state court, except as modified by sections 3469, 3470,
3472, 3473, 3477 and 3478 of the Iowa code of 1860, and by
the Act of April 8th 1862. The latter act-of which, as well as
of the state code, we must take judicial notice-substitutes, for
one of the sections of the code, the following provision: "Actions,
either ex contractu or ex delicto, do not abate by the death, marriage, or other disability of either party, nor by the transfer of
any interest therein, if, from the legal nature of the case, the cause
of action can survive or continue. In such cases, the court may,
on motion, allow the action to be continued by or against his legal
representative or successor in interest; but in case of the death
of the defendant, a notice shall be served upon his representative
under the direction of the court :" Laws of Iowa 1862, p. 229.
These statutory provisions prescribe the manner in which actions
may be revived, and the time within which such revivor must take
place. But it is clear that they do not provide for a case like the
one before us. The question here is, whether the state court was
wholly without jurisdiction to enter the decree against Mitchell
as of, or make it take effect from, the last day of the term at
which the cause, during the lifetime of Stutzman, was finally submitted for determination. We are not informed by any decision
of the Supreme Court of Iowa, to which our attention has been
called, that this precise question has been passed upon in that
tribunal. The cases, cited from that court, do not, in our opinion,
meet the question, in the exact form in which it is here presented.
Its disposition must, therefore, depend upon the rules of practice
which obtain in courts of justice, in virtue of the inherent power
they possess.
The adjudged cases are very numerous in which have been considered the circumstances under which courts may properly enter
a judgment or decree as of a date anterior to that on which it is,
in fact, rendered. We deem it unnecessary to present an analysis
of the authorities, but content ourselves with saying that the rule
established by the general concurrence of the American and
VOL. XXI.- 77
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English courts is, that where the delay in rendering judgment nr
decree arises from the act of the court, that is, where the delay
has been for its convenience, or has been caused by the multiplicity
or press of business, or the intricacy of the questions involved,
or for any other cause, not attributable to the laches of the parties,
but within control of the court, the judgment or decree may be
entered retrospectively, as of a time when it should or might have
been entered up. In such cases, upon the maxim actus curice
neminem gravabit-which has been well said to be founded in
right and good sense, and to afford a safe and certain guide for the
administration of justice--it is the duty of the court to see that
the parties did not suffer by the delay. Whether a nunc pro tune
order should be made depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. It should be granted or refused, as the justice of
the cause may require. These principles control the present case.
Stutzman was alive when the cause was argued and submitted for
decree. He was entitled, at that time, or at the term of submission, to claim its final disposition. A decree was not then
entered because the case, after argument, was taken under advisement. The delay was altogether the act of the court. Its duty
was to order a decree nune pro tunc, so as to avoid entering an
erroneous decree.
We attach no consequence to the fact that, while the cause was
under advisement as to a final decree, Mitchell asked and obtained
leave to amend his answer. The leave was granted upon terms,
but as the terms were not complied with, the amendment was
stricken from the files. The question must, therefore, be determined as if no amendment of the pleadings had been attempted.
It is scarcely necessary that we should extend this opinion by
any comments upon the numerous cases cited in the printed argument of appellant's counsel. Many of them are cases where,
although the death occurred after the submission of the cause or
after verdict, the judgment was, in fact, entered as of a time subsequent to the death. Such cases manifestly have no bearing here,
where the decree in the state court was entered as of a time when
the party was alive, and to take effect from the date when the
decree would have been entered, but for the act of the court, induced by causes beyond the control of the parties.
It seems to us to be entirely clear that the state court had the
power, upon well-settled rules of practice, both in courts of law
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and of equity, to enter the decree as of the term when, in the
lifetime of Stutzman, the cause, after argument, was finally submitted for decision.
The decree is affirmed.
lNunc pro tune judgments and decrees
are granted, whenever injustice would
otherwise result to the parties or any
one of them, either through the mistake
or delay of the court, or in certain special
cases, through the happening of a contingency not anticipated, and which, by
a mere technicality of law, is calculated
to do injury to the substantial rights of
As a general rule, the
the parties.
courts will order the entry of judgment
nunc pro tune, only where the delay is
occasioned by the act of the court:
Thony v. Dann, 77 N. Y. 516; Laicrcce v. Ilodgwon, I You. & Joe. 368;
Ryght're v. Durlam, 12 Wend. 245
Cra.Ibrd v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504 ; Griswohl v. 1Hill, 1 Paine C. C. 484 ; Cmber
v. I I'rne, 1 Str. 426 ; .lstley v. Reynolds,
2 Id. 916 ; Davi& Y. Davies. 9 Ves.
461 ; Belsuam v. Percival, 2 Cooper's
Rep. of Cases in time of Lord COLTE.it.t 431; Gr(fn V. Cobden, 4 Scott's
Ca:es 486; Blaisdell v. flurris, 52 N. II.
191: 2 Daniell's Ch. Pr., pp. 1017-1018 ;
]Freeman on Judgments, sect. 57 ; Tidd's
Pr. 952. And they will not so enter a
judgment, where the delay occurred
through the stipulation of the parties :
Oyd.n v. Lee, 3 How. Pr. 153; Diefendorfv. House, 9 Id. 243 ; lless v. Cole,
o'onge v. Broxson, 23
3 Zab. 117 ;
Ala. 684. It may be further stated,
that leave to enter nune pro tune will be
given, only when the court is satisfied
that there was good reason for the delay,
and that the rights of parties will not
thereby be affected : Galpin v. Fishburne,
3 McCord 22 ; Ferguson v. 11illandon,
12 La. Ann. 348; Hess v. Cole, 3 Zab.
117. A final judgment cannot properly
be entered nuncpro tune, without a special
order of the court. It is not a matter,
of course, to which a party is at al

events entitled, and which can be done
by a ministerial officer of the court :
Erie Railroad Co. v. Ackerson, 33 N. J.
Law 33. Very often the order for the
entry of the judgment is made in a previous order of the court, delaying the
case for further consideration. In such
cases, as soon as the judgment is rendered, it can be entered nunc pro tune,
without any further direction from the
court. Watson v. Jones, I Kelly 300.
In order that the entry of a judgment
nunc pro tune may be binding upon all
parties, due notice of the application
therefor must be given to the parties to
the cause. Otherwise the judgment has
no force except from the date of entry:
lf'omnack v. Sinford, 37 Ala. 445. But
where a confession of judgment is entered on the declaration on file, but not
on the minutes of the court, in the absence of any proof of fraud in the entry,
it may at a subsequent term be entered
upon the minutes nunc pro tune, without
notice to the defendant: Davis Y. Barker, I Kelly 559. This seems to be a
mere formality, clerical though important in its nature, and such an entry
without notice to other parties is not
likely to be productive of any injury,
since the confession of judgment by the
defendant is an acknowledgment of the
right of the plaintiff to a judgment. In
this connection it may be stated that the
service of notice need not appear on the
record, even though the notice may be
necessary : Clesnons v. Judson, Minor
395.

The record must generally show the
grounds upon which the judgment has
been entered nuc pro tune. But great
latitude is permitted by the courts as to
the details which are required to be
stated. Thus it has been held that the
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recital of the judgment, that sufficient
matter to authorize it to be entered was
disclosed to the court "by sufficient,
competent and satisfactory evidence,"
would sustain the judgment, if parties
*had appeared on motion to perfect it,
and did not show by a bill of exceptions,
or in some other appropriate manner,
ice v.
that such recital was untrue:
Gillespie, 28 Ala. 279 ; Groner v. Smith,
49 Mo. 318.
The nunc pro tune doctrine applies
both to law and equity. Where the
case is one at law, and a verdict has
been rendered in the trial court, there
seems to be no difficulty in most cases in
obtaining an entry of the judgment ne
pro tune. The questions of fact have
been decided, and the entry of the judgment has been delayed, to give the court
time for the consideration of some question of law, or for some other good
reason. In such a case the duty of the
court is plain. As a general rule, the
verdict must have been rendered and all
the questions of fact settled, before the
happening of the contingency, which
makes the judgment nunc pro tune necessary. But where the plaintiff died after
a special verdict, taken subject to a reference, and before the award, the court
held that there was a sufficient finding
fact before the death of the plaintiff
to authorize an entry of judgment nune
pro tune : Heathcote v. Wing, 11 Exch.
355. In Currier v. Lowell, 16 Pick.
170, a verdict was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, and a motion was made by
the defendant for a new trial, causing a
suspension of the entry of judgment.
After the commencement of the ensuing
term of the court, but while the motion
-was still pending, and no hearing had
been had thereon, plaintiff died. Before
the death of the plaintiff was suggested
to the court, the motion for a new trial
was heard and overruled. The court
refused to dismiss the case, and ordered
the judgment to be entered up as of a
day, when plaintiff was living. So also

in Springfield v. Worcester, 2 Cush. 52,
where the entry of judgment was post-

poned, until the court had passed upon
some reserved questions of law. In
Dial v. Holter, 6 Ohio (N. S.) 228, the
cause of delay was a motion for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment. The
law upon this branch of the subject is
very tersely stated in Tidd's Practice
952 : "If either party after verdict, had
died in vacation, judgment might have
been entered that vacation, as of the preceding term; though it would not be so
upon the Statute of Frauds in respect of
purchasers, but from the signing. And
if either party die after a special verdict,
and pending the time taken for argument or advising thereon, or on a motion
in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial,
judgment may be entered at common
law after his death, as of the term, in
which the postea is returnable, or judgment would otherwise be given nunc pro
tune; that the delay arising from the act
of the court, may not turn to the prejudice of the party."
See Gurney v.
Parks, 1 How. Pr. 140; Irvin v. Hazleton, 37 Penn. St. 465.
It is very often provided by the rules
of practice that judgments certified to
the clerk in vacation, should be entered
as of the last day of the term, but this
can only be done where trial has been
had during term time: Wicks v. Ludwig, 9 Cal. 173 ; Billings v. Berry, 50
Me. 31. In all law cases, tried before
a jury, the verdict must have been
rendered at the time from which the
judgment nunc pro tune purports to
act: Grayv. Thomas, 12 S.&M. Ill.
Courts of equity have full power to
order the entry of a decree nunc pro
tune, where the decree has been made at
the proper time, and through mistake or
omission has not been properly entered
of record. Even though the original
decree has been lost, and years have
elapsed since it was pronounced, the
court would order an entry to be made
nunc pro tune froin an office copy: Law
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rence v. Richmond, 1 Jac. & W. 241;
Donne v. Lewis, 11 Yes. 601. In .Tesson v. Brewer, 1 Dick. 371, where all
the pleadings, including the original decree, were lost, the court, twenty-one
years thereafter, upon proper proof that
such a decree had been rendered, permitted an office copy to be entered and
enrolled nunc pro tune. This rule is also
applicable to law cases. In Mfays v.
Hlassell, 4 Stew. & Port. 222, a judgment nunc pro tune was entered three
years after the rendition of the verdict.
But to authorize a judgment to be entered in such cases anne pro tune, there
must be some matter of record or memorandum of the court, as a foundation for
the claim to such a judgment: Andrews
v. Branch Bank of Mfobile, 10 Ala. 375.
!a Glass v. Glass, 24 Ala. 468, and
Yonge v. Broxson, 23 Ala. 684, the minute entries of the clerk were held to be
sufficient to justify the entry of judgment mane pro tunc. And in establishing
the claim to such an entry, reference
cannot be had to any evidence to show
what the judgment should be, other than
wrnt is furnished by the record itself:
Draughan v. Tombeckbee Bank, 1 Stew.
66. This of course does not conflict
with the cases cited above, where the
record has been lost or destroyed.
But the power of courts of equity to
enter decrees nunc pro tune, is not limited
to eases where a decree has been pronounced, and the officers have failed to
enter it as the judgment of the court.
They have gone farther than that, and
granted judgments or decrees nunc pro
tune. where no decree had been rendered,
as was done in the principal case:
Bank of United States v. Weisiger, 2
Pet. 481 ; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass.
393; Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch.
342; Wood v. Keyes, 6 Paige 479;
Vroom v. Dztmas, 5 Id. 528, and other
eases cited supra. And this power is
extended to all cases of trial by the
court without a jury, whether the cause
of action arises in law or i-1 equity:
Ehle v. Moycr, 8 How. Pr. 244. In

Vroom v. Ditmas, Chancellor WAX.went so far as to hold that a
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decree nunc pro tune could be granted
where one of the parties died before
argument.
In most of the cases cited, the death
of one of the parties has been the cause
of entering the decree or judgment nunc
pro tune: Bank of United States v. W1"eisiger, 2 Pet. 481 ; Clay v. Smith, 3 Id.
411; Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch.
342; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 ;
Wood v. Keyes, 6 Paige 479 ; Vroom v.
Ditmas, 5 Id. 528; Currier v. Lowell,
16 Pick. 170 ; Gurney v. Rzrks, 1 How.
Pr. 140; Moor v. Roberts, 3 C. B.
(N. S.) 830, and other cases cited supra.
It may also be stated here, by way of
parenthesis, that wherever, according to
the rules of practice of any court, the
suit does not abate upon tile death of one
of the parties after verdict, or in equity
after trial, tile court will not order the
entry of judgment nunc pro tune, the
necessities of the ca.e not requiring it:
Tuomy v. Dunn, 77 N. Y. 516 ; (.pely
v. Day, 4 Taunt. 701 ; Moore v. lV tervelt, 14 How. Pr. 279; Fowler v. Burdett, 20 Tex. 34 : Roberts v. White, 39
S. C. R. (7 J. & S.) 272. In the case
of Taomy v. Dunn, reference is made to
the New York Code, sects. 1210 and
763. This salutory power of the court,
however, is not restricted to cases of the
death of parties. Any cause of injury,
made effective through the act of the
court, will give the party suffering the
right to a judgment nune pro tunc. Thus
in Sprin field v. Worcester, 2 Cush. 52,
while judgment was suspended to permit a hearing of reserved questions of
law, the statute, upon which the action

was brought, was repealed without a
saving clause. Any judgment, entered
subsequent to its repeal, even in cases
already pending and submitted, would
have been irregular and subject to reversal. The court therefore ordered the
judgment to be entered as of a day previous to the repeal of the statute.
But while the courts have power in
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certain cases to enter judgments and
decrees nunc pro tune, yet no such judgment or decree can be rendered, so as to
give it a retroactive effect, and make
valid what never had any foundation in
law. The right to such a decree or
judgment must be established by something above or beyond the decree or
judgment. Where judgment is entered
nuncpro tune to cure a defective entry,
(or where there has been a verdict rendered without any entry of judgment,)
such entry relates back as between the
parties to the record, and will cure any
variance between the judgment as originally entered, and the execution issued
thereon: Jordan v. Petty, 5 Fla. 326 ;
Hyde v. Curling, 10 Mo. 359. So, also,
where an order amending a defective
entry of judgment is made after the
commencement of an equitable action,
the right to bring which is based upon
the judgment (suit to set aside an assignment of the judgment-debtor), the court
can enter such order nunc pro tune, and
thus legalize all prior proceedings in the
second action: Produce Bank v. Morton,
67 N. Y. 199; Hartv. Reynolds, 3 Cow.
42n. ; Chichesterv. Cande, Id. 39 ; M'ackay v Rhinelander, 1 Johns. Cas. 410;
Hogan v. Hoyt, 37 N. Y. 300; Fawcett
v. Vary, 59 Id. 597 ; Close v. Gillespey,
3 Johns. R. 526; Bradford v. Read, 2
Sandf. Ch. 163. Likewise where a verdict has been rendered, and execution is
issued thereon before the formal entry
of the judgment, the court will order an
entry of judgment nune pro tune: Groner
v. Smith, 49 Mo. 318. In this case
judgment was so entered to make good
the sheriff's sale of real estate on execution. The court said: "Although formal entry had not been made, it was
nevertheless a real judgment, on which
the clerk mightissue a special execution,
without waiting for judgment to be entered nune pro tune. That being the
case, the sheriff's sale and deed were
supported by a real judgment, and the
nune pro tune entry was only intended to

furnish proper evidence of this fact."
But where in equity there has been no
decree, and the supposed right can alone
be supported by such a decree made at
the time, when it should have been rendered, then the decree nune pro tune will
be of no avail. Thus in Gray v. Brignardello, I Wall. 627, a conditional and
interlocutory decree had been filed, ordering the sale of property, upon a certain contingency, not necessary to be
stated here, and a final decree was required to make the sale valid, and cover
it with the sanction of the court. This
the parties failed to obtain ; the property
was sold, and subsequently a final decree
ordering the sale was entered nunc pro
tune. The question of the validity of
the sale was submitted to the United
States Supreme Court, and it was there
held that a nunepro tune decree cannot
cure defects of so vital a character.
Judge DAvis, in delivering the opinion
of the court, says: "By no rule of law
can a decree, which was clearly an afterthought, and made subsequent to the sale.
bolster up the authority to make it.
Purchasers at a judicial sale are protected when the power to make the sale
is expressly given, not otherwise. It is
only when they buy on the faith of an
order of the court, which clearly authorizes the act to be done, that the shield of
the law is thrown around them."
Furthermore, a decree or judgment
entered nune pro tune will not be per
mitted to act retrospectively upon rights
acquired previous to the entry, and to
nullify them. The decree or judgment
so entered can subserve the interests of
parties only so far as it does not conflict
with the rights of others. So far as
third parties are concerned, the legal
effect and consequences are the same.
whether the amended judgment is formal y entered nune pro tune, or is made
at one term as a modification of a judgment rendered at a preceeding term.
taking effect only from the date of entry :
Small v. Douthitt, 1 Kans. 335. IN
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Vroom v. Ditmas, supra, the court say:
"Th
decree upon the appeal must
therefore be entered in the name of
Ditmas, as of a day previous to his
death, and subsequent to the perfecting
of the appeal. But it must be without
prejudice to any right acquired by the
respondent, under the settlement with
the widow or administratrix in New
Jersey, to resist the revival of the suit
in the name of the personal representatives of the decedent or otherwise ; or to
the rights of the defendants or any of
them, to appeal from that decree within
the usual time after it is actually entered,
in the same manner as if the complain-

ant was living at the time of entering in
the register's office, and should die."
In this case there had been a release by
the representative of the deceased, and
the court, without passing upon tile
validity of the release, the cause not
being in a situation to discuss the question, stated that the nunc pro tuc decree
would be granted, subject to the release,
if valid.
It is needless to state that such a
decree would be vacated upon proof
that it clashes with the rights of other
parties.
C. G. TIEDEMAN.
St. Louis, Mo.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
HECHT v. DITTMAN.
A sheriff's deed, executed upon a foreclosure sale, does not pass crops on the
land which are matured and ready for the harvest, although they may not have
been actually severed. Such crops possess the character of personal chattels and
are not to be regarded as a part of the realty.

BECK, J.-Two cases are presented together in this appeal.
They involve the same facts and rules of law, and are between
the same parties; they are, therefore, properly submitted together
upon the same abstract. There is no dispute as to the facts, which
are as follows: The property replevied is barley cut and in shocks,
and oats, being partly threshed and partly in bundles or sheaves,
all upon the premises where it was grown. The defendant bad
rented the land of one Ehrpe, who had previously executed two
mortgages thereon-one, the senior encumbrance, to the New
England Loan Company, and the other to the plaintiff, Hecht.
After defendant had rented the land, plaint.iff foreclosed his mortgage, and on the seventh day of July 1879, the time for the redemption from the sale as prescribed by the statute having expired,
a deed was executed by the sheriff. The other mortgage was foreclosed, and the land was sold to one not a party to this transaction,
and the time of-redemption under the statute expired August 15th
1879, when a sheriff's deed was made. The foreclosure and sale
under this mortgage cut off all claim or title held by plaintiff as
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well as by the mortgagor. Defendant continued in possession of
the land up to the trial in the court below. At the time plaintiff
received his deed the grain was not cut, but it was mature and
ready for harvesting before that day. Rainy weather had prevented the defendant from cutting the grain before plaintiff's deed
was executed. The court instructed the jury that the title of the
grain passed to plaintiff by the sheriff's deed, and directed a verdict
for plaintiff. We are required to determine whether this view of
the law be correct.
The sheriff's deed executed upon the foreclosure sale vested
plaintiff with the title of the land, and the right to all growing
crops followed the title thus acquired: Downard v. Graff, 40 Iowa
597. This rule, we think, is not applicable to grain which has
matured and is ready for the harvest. It then possesses the
character of personal chattels, and is not to be regarded as a part
of the realty: See 1 Schouler's Personal Property 125, 126; Bingham on Sales of Real Property 180, 181. This conclusion is well
supported upon the following reasons: The grain being mature, the
course of vegetation has ceased, and the soil is no longer necessary
for its existence. The connection between the grain and the ground
has changed. The grain no longer demands nurture from the soil.
The ground now performs no other office than affording a restingplace for the grain. It has the same relations to the grain that
the warehouse has to the threshed grain, or the field has to the
stacks of grain thereon. It will not be denied that when the grain
is cut it ceases to be a part of the realty. The act of cutting it,
it is true, appears to sever the straw from the land. But it is demanded by the condition of the grain. It is no longer growing.
It is no longer living blades, which require the nourishment of the
soil for its existence and development. It is changed in its nature
from growing blades of barley or oats to grain mature, and ready
for the reaper. Now the mature grain is not regarded by the law,
like the growing blades, as a part of the realty, but as grain in a
condition of separation from the soil.
Suppose the defendant had cut a part of the seventy-two acres of
grain in controversy, the grain so cut, it will not be denied, would
not have passed to plaintiff. There is no valid reason why the act
of cutting, should change the property in the grain. The work
required time, and, therefore, plaintiff loses a part of his property.
All of the grain is in the same condition-all ready for the reaper.
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The part cut is his property, while the part uncut belongs to the
land owner. We think the ownership of the grain should be determined by its condition, not by the act of cutting, which cannot be
done as soon as it is demanded by its condition. We conclude,.
that for the reason the grain was mature, and was uncut because
defendant has been unable to do the work, it cannot be regarded
as a part of the realty which passed with the deed to plaintiff.
Counsel for defendant insists that, as defendant was in the
adverse possession of the land, the action of replevin will not lie to
recover the grain. We find it unnecessary to determine the question thus raised, as we hold, that defendant's right of property in
the grain accrued, when the grain matured, whether he did or did
not hold adversely to the plaintiff after the sheriff's deed was
executed.
The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed.
Vegetable productions, as fruit or
other parts of a plant, when severed
from the body of it, or the whole plant
itself, when severed from the ground, are
evidently personal property, and pass to
the personal representatives : 1 Wins.
Exr's (6 Lond. ed.) 668 ; 2 Bl. Com.
389; Johnson v. Barber, 10 Ill. 431.
However, in Brackett v. Goddard, 54
,fe. 309, it was held, apparently after
the analogy to the case of timber trees,
blown down or severed by a stranger,
that hemlock timber trees cut down by
the owner of the land for the purpose
of removing the bark therefrom, and left
with the tops on, the owner of the land
intending to cut the tops off, and haul thq
trees off as logs to be sawed during the
ensuing winter, passed by a conveyance
of the land, though, as it was said in the
opinion of the court, it would have been
otherwise had they been cut into logs or
hewn into timber,
Vegetable productions must necessarily
be considered as divided into two classes:
1. Fruus naturales, or natural fruits,
which grow spontaneously or are not
raised by cultivation and manurance,
such as apples, pears, nuts, grass, &c.,
which, while unsevered, are considered
VOL. XXIX.- 78

as a part of the realty and go to the heir
with the land, and not to the personal
representative; and 2. Fructus industriales, which are produced annually by
labor, industry and manurance, and for
nearly every purpose are considered as
personalty, and on the death of the
owner of the inheritance, before they are
harvested, go to his executor and not to
the heir, as a compensation, as it is said,
for the labor and expense of tilling,
manuring and sowing the land. See
McCornick v. McCormick, 40 Mliss. 760 ;
1 Wis. Exr's 671, and authorities
cited. The reason of the rule as between
executor and heir of the tenant in fee
seems, however, better expressed by
Swinburne, part 7, sect. 10, to be that
the seed has been "sown in the ground
by man's industry, in hope not to continue there still, but to be separated and
reaped with increase ere long," and that
these industrial fruits were, in the purpose and intention of the deceased, separable and recoverable, even when the
will was first made,-albeit, they were
not actually separated or removed from
the ground-which purpose and intention
or destination is sufficient in a testament
to make them movable, reasons which
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seem to make this branch of the law
harmonize with what is believed to be the
controlling element in determining the
question of the removability of ordinary
fixtures.
Although growing crops, produced by
annual industry and manurance, are, as
has been stated, for most purposes regarded in the law as personal property,
it is, contrary to what one would independent of authority suppose to be
the rule, well settled upon authority,
that if a man seised in fee sows the land,
and then without reservation conveys it
away before the crop is severed, the
crop passes with the land as appertaining to it, and does not belong either to
the grantor, or to his executor, in case
he dies before severance : Powell v. Rich,
41111. 466 ; Tripp v. Hasceig, 20 Mich.
254 ; Back-enstoss v. Stabler, 33 Penn.
St. 254; Terhune v. Elberson, 3 N. J.
Law 726; Gibbons v. Dillingham, 10
Ark. 9 ; Bull v. Griswold, 19 111. 631 ;
Talbot v. Hill, 68 Id. 106 ; Bludworth
v. Hunter, 9 Rob. (La.) 256. The rule is
the same where the land on which the
crop is growing is sold and conveyed on
execution against its owner : Bear v.
Bitzer, 16 Penn. St. 175 ; Pitts v. Hendrix, 6 Ga. 452. See, however, Cassilly
v. Rhodes, 12 Ohio 88; Houts v. Showalter, 10 Id. 126, as to the rule and the
system of appraisement of land for judicial sales in Ohio, and Walton v. Jordan
65 N. C. 170. The same rule applies to
foreclosure sales of land upon which are
growing crops: Aldrich v. Reynolds, 1
Barb. Ch. 613; Lane v. King, 8 Wend.
584 ; Crews v. Pendleton, I Leigh. 297 ;
Gillett v. Balcom, 6 Barb. 370 ; Bittenger v. Baker, 29 Penn. St. 68 ; Jones v.
Thomas, 8 Blackf. 428; Shepard v.
Philbrick-, 2 Den. 174 ; Sherman v. WRlett, 42 N. Y. 150.

Upon the question directly involved
in the principal case authorities directly
in point, are few. The question arose in
Tripp v. Hlscilg, 20 Mich. 254, and a
conclusion directly opposite to that of

the principal case was arrived at. In
that case it was held that the crop in
question which was even standing unharvested on the premises, December
13th, the date of the deed, passed with
the land. In delivering the opinion of
the court, GRAVES, J., said: "Whemner
the corn would pass or not, could no
more depend upon its maturity or immaturity, than the passage of a standing
forest tree by the conveyance of the
land, would depend upon whether the
* *
*
tree was living or dead.
It is true that the authorities in alluding
to this subject generally use the words
growing crops, as those embraced by a
conveyance of the land ; but this expression appears to have been commonly
employed to distinguish crops still attached to the ground rather than to
mark any distinction between ripe and
unripe crops. A further ground for the
conclusion arrived, at was found by the
court in the certainty with which the
fact of severance could be ascertained,
and the great difficulty which in some
cases would attend the investigation of
the question of the maturity of the crop
in question. The court cite Kittredge v.
Woods, 3 N. H. 503; Heavilan v.
Heavilon, 29 Ind. 509, as sustaining
their position, in neither of which cases,
however, was the point in question directly in issue, and say, as appears
upon examination to he the case, that in
Powell v. Rich, 41 Ill. 466, the point
.here in question was not essential to the
decision of the case. In Powell v. Rich,
the court say : "It has been uniformly
held that by a conveyance of land, without a reservation in a deed, the crops
and all things depending upon the soil
for sustenance, belong to and pass with
the land. After the crops have matured,
however, it is otherwise, but until they
are matured, they constitute such an
interest in real estate, as to bring them
within the Statute of Frauds. And to
pass by a sale by the owner of the soil
it must be evidenced by a written agree-

